JOBS NOT OCCUPATIONS
Most previous research on the devaluation hypothesis has used national occupation data, rather than job-level data. In the most prevalent approach, which Tam (1997) follows, a general population sample of employees is matched with occupational skill data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and an aggregate national estimate of the gender composition of detailed census occupations derived from public use samples of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing or from Current Population Surveys. Two prominent examples are found in Sorenson (1989) and England et al. (1988) .
Because occupational data are available in all employment-oriented surveys, but direct measures of job characteristics tend to be unavailable, the use of occupational measures of sex composition and training time has been convenient. Unfortunately, the processes actually being modeled with occupational measures are often unclear. For instance, few social scientists would argue that most wages in the United States are set in national occupational labor markets. Rather, it is more plausible that the observed effects of occupational sex composition on earnings are an aggregate reflection of wage-setting processes that are worked out in local labor markets at the level of job matches within organizations (Reskin 1993 (Reskin , 1998 . Even national processes, to the extent that they exist, do so only because they occur at the local level. Following this premise, the devaluation hypothesis is about cultural stereotypes degrading the evaluation and perceived worth of tasks in concrete interactional settings (Ridgeway 1997 ). It is not surprising then that the strongest evidence for the devaluation hypothesis has been for jobs within organizations rather than at the national occupational level (Baron and Newman 1990; Bridges and Nelson 1989; Jacobs and Steinberg 1990). Tam (2000) correctly points out that studies using occupational data have typically produced weaker and somewhat contradictory results. We know that occupational measures of sex composition grossly underestimate the actual degree of gender segregation experienced by men and women at the job level (Bielby and Baron 1986 ; Peterson and Morgan 1995; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a). Occupational-level estimates of specific human capital can be expected to contain similar measurement error.2 Tomaskovic-Devey (1994) compared the use of occupation and job measures in models attempting to understand the gender wage gap. That 2 In the North Carolina data used below, the correlation between national occupation %female and %female in actual jobs is 0.618. The correlation between occupational training time (DOTSVP) and actual training time is 0.268, while the correlation between occupational required education (DOTGED) and actual required education is 0.239. American Journal of Sociology study examined the contribution of human capital, skill, and other task variables, as well as sex composition to earnings. Parallel models containing skill and sex composition variables, measured at the job and occupational levels, were compared. Sex composition effects, supporting the devaluation or status composition hypothesis, were 28% lower when occupation (33% of gap) rather than job measures (46% of the wage gap) were used. Skill contributions to the earnings gap were underestimated to a greater extent when using Dictionary of Occupational Titles measures rather than job-level measures such as task complexity, training time, and supervisory authority. Job-level skill measures were associated with 22% of the gender wage gap in that analysis, while Dictionary of Occupational Titles measures accounted for only 2% of the gap. This study produces clear evidence of substantial measurement error when occupation rather than job-level measurements are used to predict earnings. The study also demonstrates that the degree of measurement error introduced is much higher for skill measures than for sex composition.
It is entirely possible that Tam's (1997) rejection of the devaluation hypothesis reflects measurement error associated with the use of occupation rather than job measures. His elegant models, with only a single measure of specialized human capital, DOTSVP, may have exaggerated this problem. Having only one poorly measured task-related variable in the model means there were few candidates available to absorb the error variance associated with using occupational measures to model a process that actually occurs at the job level. The past practice of using either many DOT items or scales created from many DOT items no doubt served to reduce the remaining job-level skill variance unmeasured by any single occupational variable.3 Thus, Tam's (1997) models likely underestimated the potential effect on earnings of both sex composition and specific human capital. Although Tam does not use his models to decompose the gender gap, we suspect that a very large proportion of the gender gap in wages remains unexplained.4
In a recent examination of Tam's (1997) findings, England, Hermsen, and Cotter (2000) duplicate the original models using the same data but 3 In defense of Tam's models, the elegance is justified by the very real problem of high correlations among DOT variables and low correlations between these aggregate occupational measures and individual earnings, which leads to unstable estimates in earnings models. In fixing one problem, it is possible, however, that another was aggravated. Moving to job-level measures increases the correlations with earnings and decreases the correlations among skill measures and, so, fixes both problems. 4 Tam does not provide sufficient information for such calculations. We do know that similar models by Sorenson (1989) leave 43% of the gender gap unexplained. Earnings decompositions of models based on job-level measures reported by Tomaskovic-Devey (1993b, 1994) leave only 1% and 6% of the gender earnings gap unexplained.
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include an additional measure of occupation required educational credentials (DOTGED). Although in these models the effect of sex composition on wages is negative and significant after controlling for required credentials, England and her colleagues do not provide a theoretical explanation for why this measure should influence the wage process as it does. Similar to Tam's models, those developed by England et al. (2000) include measures and linked conceptualizations that are inadequate for explaining the gendered labor processes that influence individual outcomes. As a result, much of the gap in wages remains unexplained.
In his reply to England et al. (2000) , Tam (2000) suggests that adjusting for measurement error in the occupational measure of training time is sufficient to reduce the sex composition effect to nonsignificance in all models. It is unclear why Tam adjusts for measurement error only in DOTSVP, his preferred explanatory variable. By our calculations, there is slightly more measurement error in DOTGED, and some, although less, in %female in the occupation (see n. 2, above). In this article, we estimate models with much lower measurement error in all variables.
SPECIALIZED HUMAN CAPITAL
In human capital theory, individuals make investments in general and specialized human capital (Becker 1975) . General human capital represents productive capacities that would be useful to many employers, such as general educational development, labor force experience, and work habits. Specialized human capital refers to investments that have worth to specific employers. For Becker (1975) , this concept is developed in terms of firm-specific skills. Tam (1997) , lacking data on firm-specific human capital investments, develops an occupational analog in his hypothesis: "Occupational differences in the investment cost (and its correlates) of specialized human capital explain the apparent sex composition effects on wages" (p. 1658). He uses the measure of specific vocational preparation from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, DOTSVP. This is essentially an estimate of occupation-specific training time for jobs similar to the referent occupational title. Previous research has noted gender differences in on-the-job training (Duncan and Hoffman 1979; Gronau 1998; Knoke and Ishio 1998), indicating that these differences are an important part of the sex segregation/wage gap process (Altonji and Spletzer 1991; Barron, Black, and Loewenstein 1992; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993b).
The specialized human capital hypothesis is essentially about individual worker's investment choices. When applied to the gender gap in wages, this theory requires an argument as to why men and women on average would make different specialized human capital investment choices. In addition, it should allow us to explain variation in investment choices within genders as well. The classical argument is that if women expect to devote much of their adult labor time to children and household work, this may lead them to underinvest in firm-specific human capital. When women enter the labor market, because of current and anticipated household responsibilities, they anticipate leaving the labor force for domestic responsibilities, make lower specialized human capital investments, and self-select into a few female-dominated occupations (Becker 1981; Marini and Brinton 1984; Polachek 1979) . A compatible approach emphasizes traditional socialization patterns leading to female family and male market specialization, as well as to segregation of adult roles within both realms (Marini 1989; Subich et al. 1989 ). Shu and Marini (1998) recently reported that, although there has been a decline in sex-typical occupational aspirations, young men and women still tend to aspire to sex-typed occupations. Sex segregation then may reflect, at least in part, women's and men's preferences, which are formed by rationally weighing their labor market investments against their actual, possible, and perhaps even preferred domestic responsibilities.
Although incomplete, the research conducted on this domestic/market work tradeoff does lead toward fairly strong conclusions. Women, as a group, are not selecting typically female jobs, which trade higher starting wages for lower wage depreciation when they leave the labor force to have and care for children (Corcoran, Duncan, and Ponza 1984; England 1982; England et al. 1988; Marini 1989 ). The analogous compensating differential argument that women's work is more compatible with domestic work because it creates less stress and more flexibility (Barry 1985; Smith 1979; Filer 1989 ) has been examined and rejected by Glass (1990) , as well as Jacobs and Steinberg (1990). In particular, the prediction that women sacrifice upward mobility, wages, and autonomy for sex typical jobs that offer ease of work and flexibility (consistent with their domestic responsibilities) is not supported in either study.
Along similar lines, a number of studies have also shown that marriage and the presence of children are unrelated to the sex typicality of jobs (Daymont and Stratham 1983; Jacobs 1989; Glass and Camarigg 1992; Rosenfeld 1983; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a; but see Bielby 1978 ). This research not only further undermines a self-selection argument, but also brings to light an interesting contradiction. While the past research on gender and domestic responsibilities fails to support the hypothesized relationship between family responsibilities and choice of sex-typical work, other research shows a link between gender, sex-typical work, and specialized human capital when measured as on-the-job training. As such, it seems difficult to reconcile why women, on average, choose jobs com-Gender Earnings Inequality patible with domestic responsibility only in the case of firm-specific human capital, but not for starting wage, wage depreciation, effort, or flexibility.
We think the explanation for these contradictory findings is that specialized human capital represents a joint choice between at least three actors-the employee, managers or employers who allocate individuals to jobs, and coworkers who presumably provide most of the firm-specific training.5 We briefly review two theoretical approaches that outline why coworkers or employers might limit women's access to on-the-job training in the context of the sex segregation process.
SOCIAL CLOSURE
The social closure explanation of gender segregation is simply that male employees attempt to monopolize privileged positions in workplaces (Reskin 1988; Tilly 1998; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993b). In this approach, it is social closure from desirable positions within the firm that limits women's access to high wages, promotions, and skill-enhancing jobs. Many authors have found that gender workplace inequality can be understood as a process of rank segregation in which higher skill, opportunity, or authority positions are monopolized by and for men (see the reviews in Reskin [1993, 1998] ).
The social closure account is about a tendency that requires the advantaged status group to have power over the selection process in which new workers are hired or trained. The potential for social closure is lower when formal educational requirements or formal hiring procedures are followed (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993b; Tomaskovic-Devey, Kalleberg, and Marsden 1996). This is because the work group has less discretionary control over hiring and training. On the other hand, when there are long periods of work-group-controlled on-the-job training, the existing work group is particularly powerful in selecting new coworkers. Numerous examples of such male work group resistance to gender integration are found throughout the literature (e.g., Cockburn 1991; Kanter 1977; Padavic 1991; McIlwee and Robinson 1992; Eisenberg 1998).
In a social closure model, one would expect on-the-job training periods would be one of the most powerful social closure mechanisms through which existing male workforces could exclude women from desirable jobs. A social closure interpretation of Tam's (1997) findings would be that male work group exclusion of women from typically male jobs is accomplished through the monopolization of on-the-job training opportunities.
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Thus, male work groups control access to specialized firm-specific human capital, which in turn leads to high wages. The effect of sex composition upon wages would be indirect, via training time. This is precisely Tilly's (1998) interpretation of Tam's findings. Tilly (1998) goes so far as to argue that social-closure-type processes produce all or most categorical inequality, and sex composition effects on wages are largely picking up the ability of male work groups to monopolize desirable jobs (see also Stinchcomb 1990).
The level and type of skill required to do a particular job is closely linked to worker outcomes. Those jobs that require long periods of training tend to be more highly rewarded because it is assumed the degree of skill needed for these jobs is relatively high. Likewise, jobs considered to be routine generally require less training and, thus, are compensated at lower rates than jobs involving more complex tasks. Not only are jobs valued on the level of skill and task complexity, but the degree of responsibility associated with jobs also influences the overall ranking. Because these factors are intrinsically tied to job type and rank, they are often used as qualifiers for gendered jobs. For instance, jobs filled predominately by women are often ranked and typed in such a way that the level of skill, responsibility, and complexity are diminished. The social closure approach emphasizes that women's jobs develop in the context of male monopolization of skill and authority in workplaces.
GENDERED LABOR PROCESS
Acker (1990) argues that organizations are gendered in very fundamental ways. She does not mean merely that people with individual genders inhabit organizations, but that organizational routines, jobs, and behavioral assumptions reflect and embody gender in many ways. Employers and employees are actors within a gendered organizational field and generally will take the existing gendered nature of jobs, gendered assumptions about the value of work or of workers, and gendered nature of power relations for granted as part of the fabric of the organization. The devaluation hypothesis that women's work is devalued is clearly part of this gendered organizational field. A more complex version would see the gender of jobs, the value of work, joint investments in specialized human capital, and the organization of critical tasks as simultaneous products of the gendered organization.
This notion of gendered organizations suggests that in the real world we should expect complex interdependencies between gender typing, tasks and training, and rules embedded in the fabric of the organization. In Gender Earnings Inequality practice, it may be quite difficult to separate the various threads that compose a gendered organizational process.
In both the social closure and gendered organization approaches, the terrain of action is clearly the labor process within workplaces. Although the language is quite different, Becker's (1975) notion of firm-specific investments is also about relationships between employee and employers in a specific workplace. One weakness of the devaluation hypotheses is that the interactional setting in which devaluation is theorized to take place is often left untheorized. We agree with Ridgeway (1997) that gender and gender devaluation are interactional accomplishments and so must take place in concrete social settings (i.e., the workplaces where labor processes are negotiated, wages are set, and people allocated to jobs).
DATA AND MODELS
In the analyses that follow, we first reproduce Tam's models as closely as possible, except that we measure sex composition and firm-specific human capital at the job, rather than the occupational level.6 We use data from the 1989 North Carolina Employment and Health Survey for these analyses. If Tam's conclusions are merely the result of measurement error arising from the use of occupational measurements, we will expect that sex composition, measured at the job level, will be significantly associated with wages. Such a finding would support the devaluation hypothesis.
We clearly have theoretical problems with either an investment or a devaluation model if they ignore social closure and gendered organizational processes. If a social closure process was operating, one would expect that the effect of sex composition of the job is mostly indirect, whereby male work groups exclude women from access to jobs with long on-the-job training periods. In most social closure accounts, supervisory authority is also hypothesized to be monopolized by male work groups. The gendered organization approach, on the other hand, suggests that there should be complex feedback loops between %female in the job, training time, authority, and task complexity because all the organizational 6 We also estimated models that included a measure of job-required credentials (the job-level DOTGED analog) as distinct from respondent's actual education. While respondents who were underqualified for their position did earn higher wages, reflecting the skill requirements of the job, job sex composition did not become statistically significant as in England et al. (2000) . Tam (2000) argues that there is no reason to expect that DOTGED would add to human-capital-based productivity differences. We agree but conceptualize productivity as endogenous to workplace technologies and divisions of labor. Individuals who gain access to jobs that they are underqualified for would have higher wages because the jobs are more productive or otherwise valuable to the employer. processes and relationships tend to be gendered. Tam's (1997 Tam's ( , 2000 model suggests that the sex composition of jobs is unimportant and, so, unrelated to other aspects of the labor process. We use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to model these nonrecursive relationships. We do not directly observe social closure processes because we do not have access to data on actor choice and behavior. We can examine the feedback relationships between attributes of jobs to see how, if at all, the gender composition of jobs is related to and influences training time, task complexity, and supervisory authority.
The 1989 North Carolina Employment and Health Survey (NCEHS) is somewhat unique in that it allows for an examination of job-level characteristics across different workplaces. Employed adults ages 18 and older were sampled randomly and interviewed by telephone. Respondents were asked to provide detailed information about their jobs, such as title, amount of training required, size of employing establishment, and the gender and race composition of their current jobs. The NCEHS sample is representative of the North Carolina labor force and had a response rate of 72% (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993b). Although North Carolina differs somewhat from other states in terms of industrial distribution, the data examined in this study are expected to be relatively generalizable to the U.S. population in terms of the relationships between gender composition, job skills, and earnings. We estimate all models for the 698 employee/job matches for which we have valid earnings data.7
Dependent variable.-Earnings are measured as individual hourly wages. Hourly wages are conventionally used in earnings determination models where workers of varying levels/status are included. The natural log of wages is employed to correct for the right-skewed distribution, and regression coefficients are roughly interpretable in terms of percentage change. Descriptive statistics for the key variables used in these analyses are presented in table 1. Independent variables.-Following the premise of the devaluation literature, we hypothesize that wages will be lower for jobs predominately filled by women. To determine whether the gender composition of jobs influences individual earnings, a measure indicating the %female in the respondent's job is central to the analyses. In this sample, the average job is 51% female, but sex segregation is very high. The average woman is in a job 86% female, and the average man is in a job 8% female.
7 Regression-based imputations of missing data were made for all other variables with missing data. In these original data, 19 cases were missing for the measure of job training and 12 cases were missing for the measure of organizational size. Imputations were made by regressing training on task complexity and education required for a job. The same method was used for establishment size implementing industry sector variables.
Gender Earnings Inequality
Measures of job training, task complexity, and supervisory authority are included in the analyses to model potential axes of social closure. Training time (in number of weeks) needed to learn a particular job is also interpreted as the primary measure of specialized human capital. We see training time as the social product of individual job choice, employer hiring decisions, and coworker training efforts, rather than simple employee investment choices. This variable has been recoded into eight categories that correspond to the conventional coding used in DOTSVP. Task complexity is measured with a four-item scale and ranges in value from four to seven. Respondents were asked about the variety of the tasks they perform on a daily basis, autonomy, the existence and enforcement of standard rules and operating procedures required for their job, and whether there are opportunities to learn new tasks or skills. High scores represent complex and challenging jobs. Supervisory authority is measured using a seven-item summated scale, with a score of seven representing the highest degree of authority. This scale was derived from questions relating to supervisory responsibilities, decision making regarding other's work processes, financial responsibilities, terminating employment, and the ability to make changes in programs, products, or services. This taps the degree of authority or power in an organization.
A series of human capital variables are also included in the analyses. Work experience is measured in years and has been adjusted to account for known average sex differences in labor force participation (see table 1 note). Tenure represents the number of years a respondent has worked for their current employer. These two measures are modeled in quadratic form to capture potential nonlinear effects on wages. Education is measured as a series of degrees, with high school as the reference category. We also include a variable measuring the number of weeks a respondent has been unemployed since entering the workforce, ranging from 0-60 weeks. The natural log is used to adjust for the right skew to the distribution of unemployment spells. It is expected that prolonged periods of unemployment will have a negative effect on earnings.
We follow Tam (1997) in the specification of a series of organizational and industry control variables. These include establishment size, metropolitan location, unionization, and industry. Industry effects are captured with a series of 22 dummy variables. While the specific effects are not of particular interest for this study, previous research has shown that industry has an independent influence on wages, net of human capital and job characteristics (e.g., Tam 1997; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a). The interpretation of these variables is not given sustained attention by Tam (1997) . Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a), following the dual labor market literature, suggests that size and industry may capture some organizationallevel social closure processes. Since this study is primarily focused on ................................. ............................... within-organization processes (devaluation, specialized human capital, job social closure, gendered organizations), these variables will be treated simply as controls.
Statistical Models
The analytical approach used here differs from some previous studies. Most of the literature assumes that sex differences in earnings can be explained by a specified set of explanatory variables in a single-equation recursive causal model. However, we believe that differences in earnings may also be influenced by the reciprocal causation among the various characteristics of jobs. We begin our analyses using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate a series of nested earnings determination models. These models are organized to reproduce, as closely as possible, the analyses by Tam (1997) . In the first model, we include the demographic measures for sex and race. The second model adds a block of human capital measures, and %female in a job is added in the third model. Organizational variables and industry controls are introduced in the final two models, followed by job characteristic measures.8 Although having job measures is the main advantage in these data, they produce an ironic statistical problem. The correlation between job sex composition and individual gender is so high (r = .882) that we encounter multicollinearity problems when they are in the same model. Of course, what looks like a statistical problem represents an extraordinarily important substantive reality-gender segregation in employment is very high. In real workplaces, the distinction between the gender of an individual and the gender of the job is often moot. In the second phase of our analyses, we employ two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) to estimate hypothesized nonrecursive relationships among on-the-job training, the %female in a job, supervisory authority, and the degree of task complexity required for a particular job. In an ideal world, we would prefer to follow the emergence of job structures over time in multiple organizational contexts. Since we are limited to already established workplaces, we use 2SLS to provide estimates of what this more dynamic process might look like. Following Acker (1990), we would expect a series of complex feedback loops between the sex composition of jobs and other job characteristics. If the dominant process is male work groups excluding women from desirable jobs, as in the social closure account, we would expect negative relationships between super-Gender Earnings Inequality visory authority and on-the-job training time and the %female in the job. The specialized human capital and devaluation approaches do not predict feedback loops among these labor process attributes.9
OLS Analyses of Earnings
The unstandardized coefficients from the OLS regression models are presented in table 2. In the first model, we see the usual finding that women earn significantly lower wages than men, as do African-Americans compared to white respondents. In model 2, we add human capital variables. The gender gap in wages is only very slightly reduced after controlling for human capital measures. Model 3 adds the measure for the %female in a job. The coefficient for %female is significant and negative, as is typically the case.'?
Organizational and industry variables were added in model 4. While the coefficients for sex and race continue to be significant, the measure of %female in a job is no longer significant, but the coefficient is un- 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Labor Process Relationships
First-stage models were constructed to estimate predicted values of %fe-male, supervisory authority, training time, and task complexity. In order to qualify as an instrument in the first-stage prediction equations, a variable had to have 1. an observed significant bivariate correlation with one of the four labor process variables, 2. a plausible theoretical expectation for that correlation, and 3. an absence of an observed multivariate correlation with one or more of the other labor process variables. In addition, each dependent variable had to have a unique prediction equation including one or more variables that were unassociated with any of the other three. These criteria ensure that the second-stage equations will be identified. The instruments (unique instruments are italicized) for each of the outcome variables are 1. %female = other promoted out of job; autonomy; trained by other worker; other laid off; craft occupation; industries (military, mining, finance, business services, household services, personal services, educational services, transportation, medical, hospital, wholesale trade), 2. Training time = required education; been promoted; autonomy; trained by other worker; craft, professional, and laborer occupation; contract labor; establishment size; industries (agriculture, retail trade, personal services, durable manufacturing), 3. Task complexity = required education; been promoted; other pro-1 A model (not shown) was also estimated with interactions between female and the job characteristics of training, authority, and complexity. Following the theoretical literature on the devaluation hypothesis, it is expected that these job characteristics might affect earnings differently for men and women. However, upon adding the interactions to model 5, none were found to be significant. Two additional models (also not shown) were estimated: one excluding the job-level measures to determine the joint effect of %female, training, supervisory authority, and task complexity on wages; and second excluding the sex dummy variable to determine the amount of variation in wages attributable to being female independent of all other characteristics. In the first model, approximately 4% of the variance in wages are uniquely attributable to the effects of the job characteristics (significant using an incremental F test). The results from the second model indicate that only 0.2% of the variation in wages is uniquely attributable to sex (F test was not statistically significant). The vast majority of gender earnings variation happens via the job and organizational characteristics included in the model. The standardized estimates of these nonrecursive relationships among labor process variables, as well as their association with earnings and gender, are represented in figure 3. Our most general interpretation of the results diagrammed in figure 3 is that while gender typing of jobs influences training time, the more powerful causal process runs through the feedback loop between training time and task complexity, which in turn is strongly associated with the degree of authority. These results suggest the dominant process is that women are sorted into female jobs and do not gain access to firm-specific training because of that sex segregation. This restricted access to training in turn leads to less complex jobs and lower supervisory authority. When women do not get access to men's jobs, they are also not gaining access to the training opportunities those jobs afford.
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The paths from training time and supervisory authority to %female are negative as predicted, almost as large as the path from %female to training time, but not statistically significant in the model predicting 13 We also explored models in which task complexity was deleted from the 2SLS analysis since it is much less prominent in the literature on gender workplace inequality. In these models, the negative path from training time to %female is considerably stronger and statistically significant, as predicted by social closure theory. In addition, there is a significant feedback loop from %female to training time, as predicted by the gendered labor process approach. Another set of models, which included task complexity, but limited the influence of work hours to %female and training time for theoretical reasons, also produced a feedback loop between %female and training time. In addition, those models produced a significant direct path from %female to supervisory authority. These models, however, were overidentified and so are not statistically reliable. The models we present are thus the most conservative estimates given the quality of the available data. weak and organized indirectly via the gendered organization of training opportunities.
There are also reciprocal relationships between training time and task complexity and a direct effect of task complexity on the level of supervisory authority. We interpret this pattern to support an argument that firm-specific human capital is central to the organization of work. Complex tasks both require and generate firm investments in training. Jobs with supervisory authority are complex and require long training periods.
CONCLUSIONS
The notion that specialized human capital is an individual investment choice, divorced from the organizational context of that investment, should be rejected for theoretical reasons. It seems evident to us that firmspecific human capital is endogenous to the labor process. Employees, coworkers, and employers all participate in the social organization of production, including the decision regarding which individuals and jobs receive training. The reality that the social organization of most jobs are gendered means that who gains access to skilled jobs and how skilled those jobs become are not simple reflections of sex differences in investment choices. While these differences may exist, they are unlikely to exist independently of the opportunities available in concrete workplaces.
Tam's (1997) conclusion that there is not a direct devaluation of wages in women's work is supported by our estimates. The devaluation process, to the extent that it can be meaningfully separated from the gendered organization field, seems to operate through lower training time. We view our estimates as not only replicating Tam's (1997), but as more reliable because we measure both skill and sex composition at the job level rather than at the occupational level. The widespread belief that the devaluation of women's work happens when wages are assigned to a job probably needs reconsideration in light of these and Tam Both the OLS earnings models and the 2SLS labor process models include extensive industry dummy variables as control variables. In Tam's (1997 Tam's ( , 2000 , as well our analyses, the effects of sex composition on earnings are first reduced to nonsignificance upon controlling for industry, rather than training time. While industries are less segregated than jobs, they are strongly associated with both earnings variation and gender composition of firm labor forces. The practice of controlling extensively for industry in both Tam's and our models can be expected to absorb much of the historical and organizational variation in social closure and gendered organizational processes that is described in the case study literature. These industry controls are probably picking up a good deal of the historical organizational devaluation of women's work as well. Acker's (1990) gendered labor process, for example, may largely rest in the typical organizational practices found within industries, and this may be obscured by simply controlling for industry. Direct analyses of variation in the workplace contexts that produce gender segregation and inequalities is preferable if we are to develop explicit theory about the influences of organizational practices and history. We have begun such a project elsewhere (Skaggs 2001; Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 1999a, 1999b).
The typical human capital imagery of voluntary investment strategies seems to be particularly misleading. Access to on-the-job training is about the willingness of coworkers to train and of employers to hire people into jobs with long training periods. Being a woman seems to be a major barrier to on-the-job training. Women with aspirations to high earnings may find they have to follow the education route because of exclusion from more informal training opportunities in many workplaces.
We failed to produce unambiguous evidence supporting the more dynamic social closure labor process argument that male monopolization of training or supervisory authority helps create typically female jobs, while female job status reduces access to training opportunities. Because these data are cross-sectional and the nonrecursive estimates in table 3 require strong restrictions in the modeling of causal processes, we are not ready to reject this more complex social closure explanation of how labor processes develop and incorporate gender into job structures. The two models reported in note 12 did find the predicted feedback loops between gender composition and training time, but they were overidentified. Clearly, we need data on the evolution of labor processes to directly observe these social closure processes, if they exist as described theoretically. In any case, social closure processes can probably be best observed at the level of interaction. It is in the qualitative case study literature where we can most clearly see male work groups excluding women from desirable training, tasks, and jobs (Cockburn 1991 Our analyses are clearly limited by the small sample size. Some nonsignificant effects in these models might very well be significant in larger sample analyses. Thus, our potentially provocative conclusion that the gender composition of jobs has only a weak indirect effect on wages may be premature. We think it is quite likely that direct wage devaluation of woman's work does exist in, at least, some organizational contexts. However, we doubt it is the dominant process in most workplaces.
Generalizability of these findings is also limited to some extent by the use of cross-sectional data and a sample of North Carolina workplaces. Although we doubt that gendered organizational processes are very different in North Carolina than in other parts of the United States, we are more concerned with the cross-sectional character of the analysis, which obscures the dynamic organizational processes implied by our theoretical discussions. It is also likely that observations of gendered labor processes or social closure influencing the development of gender job types requires a more dynamic analysis of the unfolding of job and occupational sex typing (e.g., Cohn 1985; Reskin and Roos 1990; Reskin and Padavic 1988). We are aware of no analyses that have linked dynamic data on careers, job matching, and the evolution of jobs. On the other hand, within most organizations and for most people, job matching, gendered interactions, and skill investments happen simultaneously. In this way, cross-sectional estimates, at some level, may reflect what people experience, but not the historical processes that produce those experiences.
The key strength of these data is the fairly wide coverage of job, organization, and individual characteristics, and especially the gender composition of the respondent's job. It is this all too rare combination that made possible both the replication of Tam's (1997) results without the threat of excessive measurement error as well as the estimation of nonrecursive gendered labor process effects.
We believe this article has implications for both theory and research that should not be overlooked. On the theoretical level, we believe social science would profit enormously from a little healthy skepticism of human capital accounts focused on individual investment choices. Much of human capital acquisition is endogenous to the labor market. All firm-specific skill is organizationally endogenous. It is simply an intellectual fiction, If too much attention has been paid to the investment choices of individuals, too little has been paid to the organizational context in which inequality is produced. This may reflect, in part, the wealth of data available that was originally conceptualized within a status attainment or human capital framework. Clearly, to advance the theoretical issues raised by this work, we will need more analyses of organizations, as well as data on individuals that allow us to examine careers embedded in organizational contexts.
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